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Abstract 
Multi-hop wireless networks rely on node cooperation to provide unicast and multicast services. The multi-hop 
communication offers increased coverage for such services, but also makes them more vulnerable to insider (or 
Byzantine) attacks coming from compromised nodes that behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network. 
In this work we identify vulnerabilities of on-demand multicast routing protocols for multi-hop wireless 
networks and discuss the challenges encountered in designing mechanisms to defend against them. We propose 
BSMR, a novel secure multicast routing protocol that withstands insider attacks from colluding adversaries. Our 
protocol is a software-based solution and does not require additional or specialized hardware. We present simulation 
results which demonstrate that BSMR effectively mitigates the identified attacks. 
Multicast routing protocols deliver data from a source to multiple destinations organized in a multicast 
group. Several protocols were proposed to provide multicast services for multi-hop wireless networks. 
These protocols rely on node cooperation and use flooding [I], gossip [2], geographical position [3], or 
dissemination structures such as meshes [4], [5], or trees [6], [7]. 
A major challenge in designing protocols for wireless networks is ensuring robustness to failures and 
resilience to attacks. Wireless networks provide a less robust communication than wired networks due 
to frequent broken links and a higher error rate. Security is also more challenging in multi-hop wireless 
networks because the open medium is more susceptible to outside attacks and the multi-hop communication 
makes services more vulnerable to insider attacks coming from compromised nodes. Although an effective 
mechanism against outside attacks, authentication is not sufficient to protect against insider attacks because 
an adversary that compromised a node also gained access to the cryptographic keys stored on it. Insider 
attacks are also known as Byzantine [8] attacks and protocols able to provide service in their presence 
are referred to as Byzantine resilient protocols. 
Previous work focused mainly on the security of unicast services. Several routing protocols [9]-[12] 
were proposed to cope with outsider attacks. Methods proposed to address insider threats in unicast 
routing include monitoring [13], multi-path routing [14] and acknowledgment-based feedback [15], [16]. 
The problem of secure multicast in wireless networks was less studied and only outside attacks were 
addressed - [17]. 
Security problems related to multicast routing can be classified in routing specific security, such as 
the management of the routing structure and data forwarding, and application specific security such as 
data confidentiality and authenticity. Solutions to the latter problem also referred to as secure group 
communication focus mainly on group key management [18], [19]. In this work we are concerned with 
multicast routing specific security. 
Several differences make the multicast communication model more challenging than its unicast counter- 
part. First, designing secure multicast protocols for wireless networks requires a more complex trust model, 
as nodes which are members of the multicast group cannot simply organize themselves in a dissemination 
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Second, unlike unicast protocols which establish and maintain routes between two nodes, multicast 
protocols establish and maintain more complex structures, such as trees or meshes. For example, protocols 
relying on trees require additional operations such as route activation, tree pruning and tree merging. 
These actions do not have a counterpart in the unicast case and may expose the routing protocol to new 
vulnerabilities. 
Third, multicast protocols deliver data from one sender to multiple receivers making scalability a major 
problem when designing attack-resilient protocols. In particular, solutions that offer resiliency against 
Byzantine attacks for unicast are not scalable in a multicast setting. For example, multi-path routing affects 
significantly the data dissemination efficiency, while strategies based on end-to-end acknowledgments have 
high overhead. 
In this paper we study vulnerabilities of multicast routing protocols in multi-hop wireless networks and 
propose a new protocol that provides resilience against Byzantine attacks. Our main contributions are: 
We identify several aspects that make the design of attack-resilient multicast routing protocols more 
challenging than their unicast counterpart, such as a more complex trust model and underlying routing 
structure, and scalability. We also discuss potential attacks against such protocols. 
We propose BSMR, an on-demand multicast protocol for multi-hop wireless networks which relies on 
several mechanisms to mitigate Byzantine attacks. BSMR uses a selective data forwarding detection 
mechanism that relies on a reliability metric capturing adversarial behavior. Nodes determine the 
reliability of links by comparing the perceived data rate with the one advertised by the source. 
Adversarial links are avoided during the route discovery phase. BSMR also prevents attacks that try 
to prevent or arbitrarily influence route establishment. 
We show through simulations that the impact of several Byzantine attacks (flood rushing, black hole 
and wormhole) on a previously proposed secure multicast routing protocol is considerable and cannot 
be ignored. We also demonstrate through simulations that our protocol BSMR mitigates the attacks, 
while incurring a small overhead. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I1 overviews related work. Section I11 
presents our network and system model. We discuss the attacks against multicast in IV-B and present 
BSMR in Section V. We present experimental results in Section VI and conclude in Section VII. 
Significant work addresses vulnerabilities of unicast routing protocols in wireless networks. Several 
secure routing protocols resilient to outside attacks were proposed in the last few years such as Ariadne 
[l 11, SEAD [lo], ARAN [12], and the work in [9]. 
Wireless specific attacks such as flood rushing and wormhole were recently identified and studied. RAP 
[20] prevents the rushing attack by waiting for several flood requests and then randomly selecting one to 
forward, rather than always forwarding only the first one. Techniques to defend against wormhole attacks 
include Packet Leashes [21] which restricts the maximum transmission distance by using either a tight 
time synchronization or location information, Truelink [22] which uses MAC level acknowledgments to 
infer if a link exists or not between two nodes, and the technique in [23], which relies on directional 
antennas. 
The problem of insider threats in unicast routing was studied in [13]-[16]. Watchdog [13] relies on a 
node monitoring its neighbors if they forward packets to other destinations. If a node does not overhear a 
neighbor forwarding more than a threshold number of packets, it concludes that the neighbor is adversarial. 
SDT [14] uses multi-path routing to prevent a malicious node from selectively dropping data. ODSBR 
[15], [16] provides resilience to Byzantine attacks caused by individual or colluding nodes by detecting 
malicious links based on an acknowledgement-based feedback techniques. 
Most of the work addressing application security issues related to multicast in wireless networks focused 





























[28]. Work studying multicast routing specific security problems in wireless networks is scarce with the 
notable exception of the authentication framework by Roy et al. [17]. The framework allows MAODV 
to withstand several external attacks targeted against the creation and maintenance of the multicast tree. 
However, it does not provide resilience against Byzantine attacks. 
Multicast routing specific security was also studied in overlay networks [29]-[31]. Solutions proposed 
exploit overlay specific properties such as: existence of network connectivity between each pair of 
nodes which allows nodes to directly probe non-neighboring nodes, and highly redundant connectivity, 
guaranteeing that many disjoint paths exist. None of these properties hold in multi-hop wireless networks. 
111. NETWORK AND SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Network Model 
We consider a multi-hop wireless network where nodes participate in the data forwarding process for 
other nodes. We assume that the wireless channel is symmetric. All nodes have the same transmitting 
power and consequently the same transmission range. The receiving range of a node is identical to its 
transmission range. 
Nodes are not required to be equipped with additional hardware such as GPS receivers or tightly 
synchronized clocks. Also, nodes are not required to be tamper resistant: If an attacker compromises a 
node, it can extract all key material, data or code stored on that node. 
B. Multicast Protocol 
We assume a tree-based on-demand multicast protocol such as [6]. The protocol maintains bi-directional 
shared multicast trees connecting multicast sources and receivers. Each multicast group has a corresponding 
multicast tree. The multicast source is a special node, the group leader, whose role is to eliminate stale 
routes and coordinate group merges. Route freshness is indicated by a group sequence number updated 
by the group leader and broadcast periodically in the entire network. Higher group sequence numbers 
denote fresher routes. 
The main operations of the protocol are route discovery, route activation and tree maintenance. During 
route discovery a node discovers a path to a node that is part of the multicast tree. A requester first 
broadcasts a route request message that includes the latest known group sequence number. The route 
request message is flooded in the network using a basic flood suppression mechanism and establishes 
reverse routes to the source of the request. Upon receiving the route request, a node that is part of the 
multicast tree and has a group sequence number at least as large as the one in the route request, generates 
a route reply message and unicasts it on the reverse route. The route reply message includes the last 
known group sequence number and the number of hops to the node that originated the route reply. 
During route activation, the requester selects the freshest and shortest route (i.e., with the smallest 
number of hops to the multicast tree) from the routes returned by the route discovery operation. The 
requester activates that route by unicasting a multicast activation message. 
Three main operations ensure the tree maintenance: tree pruning, broken link repair and tree merging. 
Tree pruning occurs when a group member that is a leaf in the multicast tree decides to leave the group. 
To prune itself from the tree, the node sends a message to indicate this to its parent. The pruning message 
travels up the tree causing leaf nodes that are not members of the multicast group to prune themselves 
from the tree, until it reaches either a non-leaf node or a group member. A non-leaf group member must 
continue to act as a router and cannot prune itself from the multicast tree. 
A node initiates a link repair procedure when the upstream link in the multicast tree breaks. If the 
node cannot reconnect to the tree, it means the tree is partitioned. In this case the node runs a special 
procedure to prune non-member leaf nodes and elect a group leader for the partition. When two partitions 
of the same tree reconnect, the leader of one of the partitions coordinates the merge of the partitions, 

























IV. ATTACKS AGAINST MULTICAST ROUTING 
A. Adversarial Model 
We assume that nodes may exhibit Byzantine behavior, either alone or colluding with other nodes. 
Examples of such behavior include: not forwarding packets, injecting, modifying or replaying packets. 
We refer to any arbitrary action by authenticated nodes resulting in disruption of the routing service as 
Byzantine behavior, and to such an adversary as a Byzantine adversary. 
We consider a three-level trust model that captures the interactions between nodes in a wireless multicast 
setting and defines a node's privileges: a first level includes the source which must be continually available 
and assumed not to be compromised; a second level consists of the multicast group member nodes, which 
are allowed to initiate requests for joining multicast groups; and a third level consists of non-member 
nodes which participate in the routing but are not entitled to initiate group join requests. In order to cope 
with Byzantine attacks, even group members cannot be fully trusted. 
An attacker can disrupt the physical layer by jamming, and MAC protocols such as 802.11 can be 
disrupted by attacks using the special RTSICTS packets. This work only considers attacks targeted against 
the network level. Also, preventing traffic analysis is not the goal of this work, which focuses instead on 
survivable routing. 
B. Attacks in Multicast in Multi-Hop Wireless Networks 
An adversary can attack control messages corresponding to the route discovery, route activation and 
tree management components of the routing protocol, or can attack data messages. 
The route discovery phase can be disrupted by outside attackers creating undesired results by injecting, 
replaying, or modifying control packets. Nodes that are not in the tree can mislead other nodes into 
believing that they found and are connected to the tree. Nodes can flood the network with bogus requests 
for joining multicast groups. A Byzantine adversary can prevent a route from being established by dropping 
the request and/or response, or can influence the route selection by using wireless specific attacks such 
as wormhole and flood rushing. A Byzantine adversary can also modify the packets carrying the route 
selection metric such as hop count or node identifiers. 
An outside attacker can inject bogus route activation messages, or prevent correct route activation 
messages to reach all nodes. 
Nodes can maliciously report that other links are broken or generate incorrect pruning messages resulting 
in correct nodes being disconnected from the network or tree partitioning. In the absence of authentication, 
any node can pretend to be the group leader. Although many routing protocols do not describe how to 
select a new group leader when needed, we note that the leader election protocol can also be influenced 
by attackers. 
Attacks against data messages consist of eavesdropping, modifying, replaying, injecting data, or se- 
lectively forwarding data after being selected on a route. A special form of packet delivery disruption 
is a denial of service attack, in which the attacker overwhelms the computational, sending or receiving 
capabilities of a node. In general, data source authentication, integrity and encryption can solve the first 
attacks and are usually considered application specific security. Defending against selective data forwarding 
and denial of service cannot be done exclusively by using cryptographic mechanisms. 
V. SECURE MULTICAST ROUTING PROTOCOL 
A. BSMR Overview 
Our protocol ensures that multicast data is delivered from the source to the members of the multicast 
group, even in the presence of Byzantine attackers, as long as the group members are reachable through 
non-adversarial paths and a non-adversarial path exists between a new member and a node in the multicast 
tree. 
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To eliminate a large class of outside attacks we use an authentication framework that ensures only 
authorized nodes can perform certain operations (e.g., only tree nodes can perform tree operations and 
only nodes that possess valid group certificates can connect to the corresponding multicast tree). 
BSMR mitigates inside attacks that try to prevent a node from establishing a route to the multicast tree 
by flooding both route request and route reply such that if an adversarial-free route exists, then a route is 
established. 
BSNIR ensures resilience to selective data forwarding attacks by using a reliability metric that captures 
adversarial behavior. The metric consists of a list of link weights in which high weights correspond to low 
reliability. Each node in the network maintains its own weight list and includes it in each route request 
to ensure that a new route to the tree avoids adversarial links. 
A link's reliability is determined based on the number of packets successfully delivered on that link 
over time. Tree nodes monitor the rate of receiving data packets and compare it with the transmission 
rate indicated by the source in the form of an NIRATE message. If the perceived transmission rate falls 
below the rate indicated in the MRATE message by more than a threshold, an honest node that is a direct 
descendant of an adversarial node updates its weight list by penalizing the link to its parent and then tries 
to discover a new route to the tree. 
We note that a strategy based on end-to-end acknowledgments, although shown effective in unicast [14], 
[16], is not scalable: As the size of the multicast group increases, ACK implosion occurs at the source, 
which may cause a drastic decrease in data delivery [32]. Moreover, solutions that address the problem of 
feedback implosion in multicast protocols (e.g., feedback aggregation or a combination of ACWNACK 
messages [33]) were designed to operate under non-adversarial conditions; It is questionable if they will 
work in adversarial networks. 
Without loss of generality, we limit our description to one multicast group. Below we describe the 
previously mentioned authentication framework, the route discovery, the route activation, multicast tree 
maintenance and the selective data forwarding detection mechanisms. 
B. Authentication Framework 
In order to protect from external attacks against the creation and maintenance of the multicast tree 
BSMR uses a framework similar with the one in [17]. The framework prevents unauthorized nodes to be 
part of the network, of a multicast group, or of a multicast tree. These forms of authentication correspond 
to the trust model described in Section IV-A. Each node authorized to join the network has a pair of 
publiclprivate keys and a node certijicate that binds its public key to its IP address. Each node authorized 
to join a multicast group has an additional group certijicate that binds its public key and IP address to 
the IP address of the multicast group. 
Nodes in the multicast tree are authenticated using a tree token, which is periodically refreshed and 
disseminated by the group leader in the multicast tree with the help of pairwise shared keys established 
between every direct tree neighbors. Thus, only nodes that are currently on the tree will have a valid tree 
token. To allow any node in the network to check that a tree node possesses a valid tree token, the group 
leader periodically broadcasts in the entire network a tree token authenticator f ( tree token) ,  where f is 
a collision resistant one-way function. Nodes can check the validity of a given tree token by applying the 
function f to it and comparing the result with the latest received tree token authenticator. 
To prevent tree nodes from claiming to be at a smaller hop distance from the group leader than they 
actually are, we use a technique based on a one-way hash chain. The last element of this hash chain, 
referred to as hop count anchor, is broadcast periodically by the group leader. 
We assume that nodes have a method to determine the source authenticity of the received data (e.g., 



































C. Route Discovery 
BSMR's route discovery allows a node that wants to join a multicast group to find a route to the multicast 
tree. The protocol follows the typical route requestlroute reply procedure used by on-demand routing 
protocols with several differences. To prevent outsiders from interfering, all route discovery messages 
are authenticated using the public key corresponding to the network certificate. Only group authenticated 
nodes can initiate route requests and the group certificate is required in each request. Tree nodes use the 
tree token to prove their current tree status. 
Several mechanisms are used to address internal attackers: (a) both route request and route reply are 
flooded in order to ensure that, if an adversarial-free path exists, it will be found; (b) the path selection 
relies on the weights list carried in the response flood and allows the requester to select a non-adversarial 
path; (c) the propagation of weights and path accumulation is performed using an onion-like signing to 
prevent forwarding nodes from modifying the path carried in the response. 
The requesting node broadcasts a route request (RREQ) message that includes the node identifier and its 
weight list, the multicast group identifier, the last known group sequence number, and a request sequence 
number. The RREQ message is flooded in the network until it reaches a tree node that has a group 
sequence number at least as great as that in the RREQ. Only new requests are processed by intermediate 
nodes. 
When a tree node receives for the first time a RREQ from a requester and the node's group sequence 
number is at least as great as that contained in the RREQ, it initiates a response. The node broadcasts 
a route reply (RREP) message that includes that node identifier, its recorded group sequence number, 
the requester's identifier, a response sequence number, the group identifier and the weight list from the 
request message. To prove its current tree node status, the node also includes in the response the current 
tree token, encrypted with the requester's public key. The RREP message is flooded in the network until 
it reaches the requester, using the following weighted Jlood suppression mechanism. Tree nodes with a 
group sequence number at least as great as that in the RREiP ignore RREP messages. Otherwise, a node 
computes the total path weight by summing the weight of all the links on the specified path from the 
multicast tree to itself. If the total weight is less than any previously forwarded matching response (same 
requester, multicast group and response sequence number), and all the signatures accumulated on the 
reply are valid, the node appends its identifier to the end of the message, signs the entire message and 
rebroadcasts it. As the RREP message propagates across the network, nodes establish the forward route by 
setting pointers to the node from which the RREP was received. Although several tree nodes may initiate 
the response flood, the weighted flood suppression mechanism insures the communication overhead is 
equivalent to only one flood. 
When the requester receives a response, it performs the same computation as an intermediate node 
during the response propagation. The requester updates its information upon receipt of a valid response 
that contains a better path according to our reliability metric. 
D. Multicast Route Activation 
The requester signs and unicasts on the selected route a multicast activation (MACT) message that 
includes its identifier, the group identifier and the sequence number used in the route request phase. An 
intermediate node on the route checks if the signature on MACT is valid and if MACT contains the same 
sequence number as the one in the original RREQ message. The node then adds to its list of tree neighbors 
the previous node and the next node on the route as downstream and upstream neighbors, respectively, 
and sends the MACT message along the forward route. 
The requester and the nodes that received the MACT message could be prevented from being grafted 
to the tree by an adversarial node, selected on the forward route, which drops the MACT message. To 
mitigate the attack, these nodes will start a waiting to connect timer (WTC-Timer) upon whose expiration 
nodes isolate a faulty link and initiate Route Discovery (Event 3 of Sec. V-F). The timers are set to expire 
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after a value proportional to a node's hop distance to the tree, in the hope that the nodes closer to the 
tree will succeed in avoiding the adversarial node and will manage to connect to the tree. After a node 
becomes aware of its expected receiving data rate, it cancels its WTC-Timer and behaves as described in 
Sec. V-F. 
E. Multicast Tree Maintenance 
The tree maintenance phase ensures the correct operation of the protocol when confronted with events 
such as pruning, link breakage and node partitioning. Routing messages exchanged by tree neighbors, such 
as pruning messages (described in Sec. 111-B) are authenticated using the pairwise keys shared between 
tree neighbors. If a malicious node prunes itself even if it has a subtree below it, the honest nodes in this 
subtree will reconnect to the tree following the procedure described in Sec. V-F. The link repair procedure 
is initiated by nodes that detect a broken link and is similar with Route Discovery. 
The group leader periodically broadcast in the entire network a signed Group Hello message that contains 
the current group sequence number, the tree token authenticator and the hop count anchor (described in 
Sec. V-B). 
F: Selective Data Forwarding Detection 
The source periodically signs and sends in the tree a multicast rate (MRATE) message that contains its 
data transmission rate po. As this message propagates in the multicast tree, nodes may add their perceived 
transmission rate to it. The information in the MRATE message allows nodes to detect if tree ancestors 
perform selective data forwarding attacks. Depending on whether their perceived rate is within acceptable 
limits of the rate in the MRATE message, nodes alternate between two states. The initial state of a node 
is Disconnected; After it joins the multicast group and becomes aware of its expected receiving data rate, 
the node switches to the Connected state. Upon detecting a selective data forwarding attack, the node 
switches back to the Disconnected state. 
A network operating normally exhibits some amount of natural "loss", which may cause the rate 
perceived by a node to be smaller than the rate perceived by its tree parent. This natural rate decrease is 
cumulative as data travels further away from the source. We define a threshold b as the upper bound for 
the tolerable loss rate on a single link. If a node's perceived rate is smaller than the last recorded rate in 
MRATE by more than b, the node concatenates its identifier and its rate to MRATE and signs the entire 
message before forwarding it. These added rates serve as proofs that nodes which previously forwarded 
the MRATE message did not perceive losses much larger than natural losses. 
In order to prevent a malicious node from introducing a rate decrease significantly larger than b, we use 
another threshold A > b. Upon receiving an NlRATE message, each node first checks if the difference 
between the last rate in MRATE and the node's perceived rate is greater than A. If so, this indicates 
that there exists at least an adversarial node in between this node and the node that added the last rate 
to MRATE. The first honest node that notices a difference larger than A incriminates the link to its tree 
parent as faulty (by using an multiplicative weight increase scheme) and assumes responsibility for finding 
a new route to the tree. The nodes in the subtree below this node will notice there is a "gap" greater than 
A between the rates included in MRATE; They will defer taking any action to isolate the faulty link for 
an amount of time proportional to the distance from the node that already started the repair procedure, 
in the hope that the nodes closer to the faulty link will succeed in isolating it. Upon detecting that the 
expected data packet rate has been restored, nodes cancel the repair procedure. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 describe how a Connected node reacts to the following events, respectively: (1) 
receipt of an MRATE message, (2) timeout of the MRATE-Timer, and (3) timeout of the WTC-Timer. 
pnode denotes the rate at which the node receives packets from its tree parent. 
Tree nodes expect to periodically receive MRATE messages, otherwise the MRATE-Timer will expire. 
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Fig. 1: receipt of MRATE = (po, (idl,pl), . . . , (idk,pk)) 
1. if this is the first MRATE message received then 
2. switch to Connected state 
3. cancel WTC-Timer 
4. store MRATE message and cancel MRATE-Timer 
5. if state = Connected and WTC-Timer # PENDING then 
6. if MRATE contains a "gap" larger than A then 
7. start WTC-Timer timer 
8. forward MRATE 
9. return 
10. else if WTC-Timer = PENDING then 
11. if MRATE contains a "gap" larger than A then 
12. MRATE = cat-and-sign(MRATE, (idnode, pnode)) 
13. forward MRATE 
14. return 
15. else 
16. cancel WTC-Timer 
17. switch to Connected state 
18. if pk - pnode > A then 
19. MRATE = cat-and-sign(MRATE, (idnode, pnode)) 
20. if WTC-Timer = PENDING then 
21. cancel WTC-timer 
22. switch to Disconnected state 
23. increase weight of the link to the parent 
24. initiate Route Discovery 
25. else if pk - pnode > b then 
26. MRATE = cat-and-sign(MRATE, (idnode, pnode)) 
27. forward MRATE message 
28. start MRATE-Timer 
Fig. 2: timeout of MRATE-Timer 
1. if state = Connected and WTC-Timer # PENDING then 
2. retrieve stored MRATE = (po, (idl, pl), . . . , (idk, pk)) 
3. if pk - pnode > A then 
4. MRATE = cat-and-sign(MRATE, (idnode, pnode)) 
5. switch to Disconnected state 
6. increase weight of the link to the parent 
7. initiate Route Discovery 
8. else if pk - pnode > b then 
9. MRATE = cat-and-sign(MRATE, (idnode, pnode)) 
10. forward MRATE message 
Fig. 3: timeout of WTC-Timer 
1. switch to Disconnected state 
2. increase weight of the link to the parent 
3. initiate Route Discovery 
of MRATE if MRATE-Timer expires. Also, when MRATE-Timer expires a node compares its perceived 
rate with the expected rate from the stored MRATE message. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To the best of our knowledge, the only security mechanism proposed on-demand multicast protocols is 
the authentication framework by Roy et al. [17], to which we refer as A-MAODV. Although A-MAODV 
withstands several external attacks targeted against the creation and maintenance of the multicast tree, it 
does not provide additional resilience against Byzantine attacks. In this section, we study the effect of 
several Byzantine attacks on the performance of A-MAODV and we simulate the same attacks against 
BSMR in order to show its effectiveness in mitigating the attacks. 
Implementation. We implemented BSMR using the ns2 simulator [35], starting from an MAODV 
implementation [36]. We assumed the protocol uses RSA [37] with 1024-bit keys for public key operations, 
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AES [38] with 128-bit keys for symmetric encryptions and HMAC [39] with SHAl as the message 
authentication code. 
The values used for 6 and A were 10% and 20% of the source's rate, respectively. We developed a 
protocol-independent Byzantine attack simulation module for ns2. 
A. Experimental Methodology 
To capture a protocol's effectiveness in delivering data to the multicast group, we used as a performance 
metric the packet delivery ratio (PDR), defined as: 
PT PDR = - 
P, . N 
where P, is the number of data packets received by multicast group members, P, is the number of data 
packets sent by the source and N is the size of the group. 
Because external attacks can be prevented using the authentication framework described in Sec. V-B, 
in this paper we focus on the following three Byzantine attacks: 
-black hole attack: This is a selective data forwarding attack, in which adversaries only forward routing 
control packets, while dropping all data packets. 
-wormhole attack: Two colluding adversaries cooperate by tunneling packets between each other in 
order to create a shortcut (or wormhole) in the network. The adversaries use the low cost appearance of 
the wormhole in order to increase the probability of being selected on paths; Once selected on a path, 
they attempt to disrupt data delivery by executing a black hole attack. 
-flood rushing attack: The attack exploits the flood duplicate suppression technique used by many 
wireless routing protocols. By "rushing" an authenticated flood through the network before the flood 
traveling through a legitimate route, a Byzantine adversary ends up controlling many routes. The attack 
can be implemented by simply ignoring the small randomized delays which are normally required to 
reduce the number of collisions. Flood rushing can be used to increase the effectiveness of a black hole 
or wormhole attack. 
In order to quantify the impact of adversarial positioning, we consider the following scenarios: 
-random placement: adversaries are placed randomly in the simulation area; 
-strategic placement: adversarial placement is as follows: 
black hole attack: adversaries are placed strategically around the multicast source, equidistant on a 
circle with radius of 200 meters. 
wormhole attack Given k adversaries, one adversary is placed near the source, at coordinates 
(650,650). The other k - 1 adversaries are placed throughout the simulation area so that the areas 
covered by their transmission range overlap as little as possible. Each one of the k - 1 adversaries 
is connected via a wormhole tunnel to the adversary placed near the source, thus creating k - 1 
wormholes. 
In Fig. 4, we illustrate the strategic adversarial placement for the black hole attack (in the presence of 
6 adversaries) and for the wormhole attack (in the presence of 7 adversaries). 
To study the influence of whether the adversaries explicitly join the multicast group and the order of 
joining, we consider two scenarios: 
-N JOIN: adversarial nodes do not join the group; 
-JOIN: adversarial nodes explicitly join the group before any of the honest members join. The adversaries 
are considered group members in the formula for PDR. 
We chose these test case scenarios in order to study the impact of the attacks under a light set of 
conditions (adversaries are placed randomly, or they do not explicitly join the multicast group) and under 
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(a) Black hole: 6 adversaries (b) Wormhole: 7 adversaries 
Fig. 4: Examples of strategic adversarial placement for the black hole and wormhole attacks 
B. Simulation Setup 
We performed simulations using the ns2 network simulator [35]. Nodes were set to use 802.11 radios 
with 2 Mbps bandwidth and 250 meters nominal range. The simulated time was 600 seconds. We randomly 
placed 100 nodes within a 1500 by 1500 meter area and the multicast source in the center of the area at 
coordinates (750,750). We experimented with different values for group size (10, 30 and 50), for number 
of adversaries (between 16% and 60% of the group size) and for "max" speed (0, 2 and 5 mls). 
Group members join the group sequentially in the beginning of the simulation, each one at an interval 
of 3 seconds. Then the source transmits multicast data for 600 seconds at a rate of 5 packets per second, 
each packet of 256 bytes (resulting in loads between 100-500 Kbps across all receivers). The members 
stay in the group until the end of the simulation. Adversaries added to the network replace honest nodes, 
thus modeling the capture of honest nodes. 
We used a random way-point mobility model, but we incorporated changes to address concerns raised 
in [40] about the validity of the standard random way-point model. In particular, nodes select a speed 
uniformly between 10% and 90% of the given maximum speed to achieve a more steady mobility pattern 
and ensure that the average speed does not drop drastically over the course of the simulation. In addition, 
300 seconds of mobility are generated before the start of the simulation so that nodes are already in 
motion. This allows the average speed and node distribution to stabilize before the simulation starts. 
Each data point in the figures is averaged over 30 different random environments and over all group 
members. 
We evaluate the PDR as a function of the number of adversaries, for different group sizes and levels 
of mobility. Each graph of sections VI-C and VI-D illustrates the effect of the attacks with and without 
flood rushing. 
C. Attack Resilience: The black hole attack 
a )  Impact of Adversarial Placement: Figures 5 and 6 show the results for random and strategic 
adversarial placement, respectively. For random placement we see that, for the same group size, the PDR 
of A-MAODV decreases as the number of adversaries increases. For the same number of adversaries, it 
also decreases as we increase the group size. However, random adversarial placement causes the number of 
group members in the subtree below an adversary to be low; Thus a relatively large number of adversaries 
is needed to cause a significant disruption (e.g., 30 adversaries for a group of size 50 can cause the PDR 
to drop below 50%). In the presence of flood rushing, the PDR decreases further because adversaries 
actively try to get selected themselves as part of the tree. The impact of flood rushing decreases as the 
group size and the nodal speed increase. 
We notice that, for A-MAODV, increasing the nodal speed does not have a negative effect on the PDR; 
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Fig. 5: Black hole attack and flood rushing combined with black hole: Random placement (NJOIN) 
mobility is compensated by the fact that group members get a chance to reconnect to the multicast tree 
in a different position, possibly connected to the source through an adversarial-free path. For the same 
reason, the effect of flood rushing is diminished as the nodal speed increases. 
BSMR is almost unaffected by the black hole attack (see Fig. 5). The PDR drops by less than 10% 
even in the presence of 20 adversaries. In addition, the influence of flood rushing is unnoticeable. This 
shows the effectiveness against flood rushing of BSMR's strategy, which includes the processing of all 
response flood duplicates and the metric capturing past behavior of adversarial nodes. Mobility causes a 
slight PDR decrease, which is natural because higher speeds will cause more link breaks. 
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(g) 50 members; 0 mls (h) 50 members; 2 m/s (i) 50 members; 5 mls
Fig. 5: Black hole attack and flo d rushing combined with black hole: Random placement (NJOIN)
mobility is compensated by the fact that group members get a chance to reconnect to the multicast tre
in a different position, pos ibly connected to the source through an adversarial-fre path. For the same
reason, the effect of flo d rushing is diminished as the nodal spe d increases.
BSMR is almost unaffected by the black hole attack (se Fig. 5). The PDR drops by les than 10%
even in the presence of 20 adversaries. In ad ition, the influence of flo d rushing is un oticeable. This
shows the effectiveness against flo d rushing of BSMR's strategy, which includes the processing of all
response flo d duplicates and the metric capturing past behavior of adversarial nodes. Mobility causes a
slight PDR decrease, which is natural because higher spe ds will cause more link breaks.
1 +A-MAODV ++A-MAODV-rush t BSMR +BSMR-rush 1 
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Fig. 6: Black hole attack and flood rushing combined with black hole: Strategic placement (NJOIN) 
In the previous experiments, the adversaries were randomly placed. Fig. 6 shows the results when 
adversaries are strategically positioned as described in Section VI-A. For A-MAODV we notice a drastic 
drop in the PDR. For example, at 0 d s ,  when the group size is 30, only 5 adversaries (representing 16% 
of the group size) are able to reduce the PDR to 25% by executing the black hole attack with flood rushing. 
This is a direct consequence of the fact that an adversary is now selected in the tree closer to the root 
and the subtree below it may potentially contain many group members. For the same reason, the negative 
effect of the flood rushing attack is now emphasized when compared to the random placement case. We 
conclude that strategic adversarial positioning has a crippling effect on the performance of A-MAODV. 
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Fig. 7: Black hole attack and flood rushing combined with black hole: Random placement (JOIN) 
On the contrary, the effect of strategic adversarial positioning on BSMR is minor (Fig. 6). Like for 
random placement, the PDR drops by less than 10% even in the presence of 20 adversaries, at low nodal 
speeds. When more adversaries are present, we see a slightly larger PDR decrease because there are less 
available honest nodes left in the network to serve as intermediaries for the group members. The resilience 
of BSMR to attacks that otherwise have a devastating effect on A-MAODV validates the effectiveness of 
BSMR's approach. 
b) Impact of Explicit Join and Join Order: To analyze the impact of explicit join of adversaries to the 
multicast group (JOIN), when compared to the NJOIN case, we look again at the cases where adversaries 
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Fig. 8: Black hole attack and flood rushing combined with black hole: Strategic placement (JOIN) 
are randomly and strategically placed (Figures 7 and 8, respectively). Each figure also shows the ideal 
PDR (labeled ideal), which would be obtained if every one of the honest group members would receive 
all the packets sent by the source. The effectiveness of an attack should be interpreted as the diflerence 
between the ideal line and a protocol's PDR line. An attack is effective if this difference increases as the 
number of adversarial nodes is increased; On the other hand, a protocol resilient to attack appears as a 
line that remains parallel to the ideal line. 
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PDR as the number of adversaries increases. In addition, we see a major difference from the NJOIN case: 
When the adversaries explicitly join the group before the honest nodes join, the impact of flood rushing 
is minimal because the adversaries are already part of the group and rushing control packets does not 
provide any additional benefit. On the contrary, in this case flood rushing may actually improve the PDR 
% 
because, by rushing control packets, adversaries may help legitimate nodes to find routes faster. Also, 
in MAODV a joining node activates a route only after waiting an interval of time, during which it may 
receive several route reply messages. At the end of this interval, it selects the best route according to 
a hop count metric. Thus, even if a adversarial tree node managed to rush its route reply, it may get 
overwritten by a legitimate route reply with a better hop metric. 
A drastic drop in the PDR is observed for A-MAODV when adversaries are placed strategically (see 
Fig. 8). We conclude that strategic positioning has a crippling effect on the performance of A-MAODV 
even more when adversaries explicitly join the multicast group. For both random and strategic adversarial 
placement, BSMR is barely affected by the attacks: In most cases the PDR line remains almost parallel to 
the ideal line, which shows little degradation occurs as the number of adversaries increases. The impact 
of the attacks on BSMR increases slightly when a large number of adversaries have joined the group, 
because there are less available honest nodes left in the network to serve as intermediaries for honest 
group members. We conclude that BSMR's strategy is effective in the JOIN case as well. 
D. Attack Resilience: The wormhole attack 
c )  Impact of Adversarial Placement: Figures 9 and 10 show the results for random and strategic 
adversarial placement, respectively. Unlike in the experiments for the black hole attack, where the maxi- 
mum number of adversaries was varied proportionally with the group size, for the wormhole attack only 
up to 12 adversaries (forming 6 wormholes) and up to 7 adversaries (forming 6 wormholes) were used 
for the random and strategic placement cases, respectively, regardless of the group size. 
When adversaries are placed randomly, the delivery ratio of A-MAODV is affected by an increase in the 
number of adversaries, as expected. In general, we notice that the wormhole attack causes more damage 
than the black hole attack because less adversarial nodes are needed to decrease the delivery ratio by the 
same amount. As an example, for speed of 0 m/s and group size of 30 members, only 10 nodes forming 
wormholes can reduce the PDR to 60%; On the other hand, 20 adversaries executing the black hole attack 
are needed to reduce the PDR by the same amount. Flood rushing has a noticeable impact especially for 
small group sizes and for low mobility levels. Increasing the nodal speed reduces slightly the impact of 
the wormhole and flood rushing attacks. The explanation is similar with that for the black hole attack: 
Mobility causes link breaks and honest nodes reattach themselves in different positions in the multicast 
tree, possibly connected to the source through non-adversarial paths. 
The wormhole attack has a minor effect on the delivery ratio of BSMR and the addition of flood 
rushing has no effect. The PDR drops by less than 10% for all simulated scenarios, even at higher levels 
of mobility and remains above 90% for most simulated scenarios. This confirms the effectiveness of 
BSMR's strategy against the wormhole attack. 
Fig. 10 shows the results when adversaries are strategically placed and form wormholes as described 
in Section VI-A. Because one end of each wormhole is near the source, the other end of the wormhole 
will present attractive, short routes to the nodes that are in its transmission range. This has a serious 
impact on the delivery ratio of A-MAODV: When 7 adversaries are present, forming 6 wormholes, they 
cover almost completely the entire simulation area; Thus, every honest node that is normally more than 
three hops away from the source will be tricked into connecting to the multicast tree through one of the 
adversarial nodes. When flood rushing is employed, even nodes that are normally less than three hops 
away from the source are also tricked into connecting through adversarial nodes. This. has a serious impact 
on the PDR of A-MAODV, which drops as low as 23% (a drop of over 70%) when flood rushing is present 
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Fig. 9: Wormhole attack and flood rushing combined with wormhole: Random placement (NJOIN) 
for 0 m/s and group size is 30. We conclude that a small number of strategically placed adversaries can 
cause considerable damage when A-MAODV is used. 
For BSMR, strategic placement results in a slim increase in the delivery ratio drop, when compared to 
the random placement case. For most simulated scenarios, the PDR drops by less than 10%. The solid 
performance of BSMR serves as proof for the robustness of its approach. 
d)  Impact of Explicit Join and Join Order: To analyze the impact of explicit join of adversaries to the 
multicast group (JOIN), when compared to the NJOIN case, we look again at the cases where adversaries 
are randomly and strategically placed (Figures 11 and 12, respectively). Eacli figure also shows the ideal 
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Fig. 10: Wormhole attack and flood rushing combined with wormhole: Strategic placement (NJOIN) 
PDR (labeled ideal), which would be obtained if every one of the honest group members would receive 
all the packets sent by the source. The effectiveness of an attack should be interpreted as the diflerence 
between the ideal line and a protocol's PDR line. An attack is effective if this difference increases as the 
number of adversarial nodes is increased; On the other hand, a protocol resilient to attack appears as a 
line that remains parallel to the ideal line. 
In general, for both random and strategic adversarial placement, the effect of flood rushing on both 
A-MAODV and BSMR is unnoticeable. However, the reasons behind the immunity to flood rushing are 
different: BSMR prevents flood rushing attacks by using a reliability metric and by processing all flood 
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Fig. 11: Wormhole attack and flood rushing combined with wormhole: Random placement (JOIN) 
duplicates, forwarding the ones with a better metric. As already explained in Sec. VI-C, A-MAODV's 
immunity to flood rushing is simply an artefact that the adversarial nodes join the multicast tree before 
the honest nodes do. 
When adversaries are placed randomly (Fig. 11), the impact of the wormhole attack on A-MAODV 
is significant and increases as the number of wormholes increases. BSMR's delivery ratio line remains 
almost parallel with the ideal line, which means that little degradation occurs as more adversaries join 
the multicast group. 
The devastating impact of the wormhole attack on A-MAODV becomes obvious when adversaries are 
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Fig. 12: Wormhole attack and flood rushing combined with wormhole: Strategic placement (JOIN) 
strategically placed (Fig. 12). When 7 adversaries are present, the difference between the ideal line and 
A-MAODV's line increases by more than 60% at 0 mls, for both group sizes of 30 and 50 (causing the 
PDR to drop to 15-20%). BSMR is affected slightly more than when adversaries are randomly placed, 
but in all simulated scenarios the difference between the ideal line and BSMR's line does not grow more 
than 8%, even in the presence of 7 adversaries. This validates the effectiveness of BSMR's strategy in 
the JOIN case a well. 
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Fig. 13: BSMR overhead 
E. Protocol Overhead 
We first compare the overhead incurred by A-MAODV and BSMR in a non-adversarial scenario 
(Fig. 13(a)), for group sizes of 10 and 30, under different levels of mobility. BSMR has higher overhead 
because both route request and route reply are broadcast, and because of the extra MRATE packets 
broadcast periodically. BSMR's overhead due to double flooding in the route discovery phase becomes 
more noticeable especially at higher levels of mobility, when link breaks occur more often. 
We then compare the overhead under adversarial conditions. In Fig. 13(b) we focus on one of the 
strongest studied attack scenarios: Black hole with strategic adversarial placement. For the NJOIN case, 
BSMR's additional overhead compared to A-MAODV grows slowly as the number of adversaries increases 
(from 40 more packetslsec. for 0 adversaries to 55 more packetslsec. for 20 adversaries). For the JOIN 
case, the additional overhead does not grow as we increase the number of adversaries. This indicates 
that as the number of adversaries increases, BSMR incurs little extra overhead over the non-adversarial 
case. This is not surprising: the bulk of the additional overhead is caused by the initial route discovery 
phase which leads to the creation of the multicast tree with avoidance of adversaries; Afterwards, BSMR's 
additional overhead consists only of periodical MRATE packets and of occasional route discovery in case 
a link breaks due to mobility. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have discussed several aspects that make designing attack-resilient multicast routing 
protocols for multi-hop wireless networks more challenging when compared to their unicast counterpart. 
A more complex trust model and underlying structure for the routing protocol make solutions tailored for 
unicast settings not applicable for multicast protocols. In the absence of defense mechanisms, Byzantine 
attacks can prevent multicast protocols to achieve their design goals. 
We have proposed BSMR, a routing protocol which relies on novel general mechanisms to mitigate 
Byzantine attacks. BSMR identifies and avoids adversarial links based on a reliability metric associated 
with each link and capturing adversarial behavior. Our experimental results show that BSNLR's strategy is 
~A-MAODV-10 -S-A-MAODV-30
...... BSMR-10 ..... BSMR-30
~A-MAODV-NJOIN -S- A-MAODV-JOIN



















































effective against strong insider attacks such as black holes and flood rushing. We believe that this strategy 
can also be effective against wormhole attacks and defer the experimental validation for future work. 
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